December 23, 2015

Leaked documents that were not attributed to Snowden

(Latest UPDATE: April 20, 2017)

Since June 2013, numerous top secret documents from the American signals intelligence agency NSA and its British counterpart GCHQ have been disclosed. The overwhelming majority of them came from the former NSA contractor Edward Snowden.

But what many people probably didn't notice, is that some of these documents (some being very compromising and embarrassing for NSA) were not provided by Snowden, but by other leakers.

Often, the press reports didn't mention that very clear, and it was only by not attributing such documents to Snowden, that it became clear they apparently came from someone else.

So far, the following classified documents have been disclosed without having been attributed to Snowden:

- Chancellor Merkel tasking record
- TAO's ANT product catalog
- NCTC watchlisting guidance
- NCTC terrorist watchlist report
- XKEYSCORE rules: New Zealand
- Ramstein AFB supporting drone operations
- NSA tasking & reporting: France
- NSA tasking & reporting: Germany
- NSA tasking & reporting: Brazil
- NSA tasking & reporting: Japan
- Chinese cyber espionage against the US
- XKEYSCORE agreement between NSA, BND and BfV
- The Drone Papers
- Cellphone surveillance catalogue
- US military documents: Iraq and Afghanistan
- NSA tasking & reporting: EU, Italy, UN
- TAO hacking tools (The Shadow Brokers)
- FBI & CBP border intelligence gathering
- TAO IP addresses and domain names
- TAO Windows files
- CIA hacking tools (Vault 7)
- TAO Solaris exploits
- TAO Windows exploits + SWIFT files

- Some thoughts on the form of the documents
- Some thoughts on the motives behind the leaks
- Conclusion

Document collections

The most user-friendly collection of all the leaked documents can be found on the website IC Off The Record (which started as a parody on IC On The Record, the official US government website on which declassified documents are published).

Other websites that collect leaked documents related to the Five Eyes agencies, so from Snowden as well as from other sources, are FVEY Docs and Cryptome. The Snowden-documents are also available and searchable through the Snowden Surveillance Archive.

Domestic US leaks

Here, only leaks related to foreign signals intelligence and related military topics will be listed. Not included are therefore documents about American domestic operations, like for example several revelations about the DEA.

Also not included are stories based upon leaks of information without original documents being published, like for example about NSA's interception efforts against Israel.

          - Documents not attributed to Snowden -         

Chancellor Merkel tasking record

On October 23, 2013, the German magazine Der Spiegel revealed that the NSA may have eavesdropped on the cell phone of chancellor Merkel. This was based upon "the excerpt from an NSA database about Merkel's cell phone", which the magazine received.* A journalist from Der Spiegel made a transcription of the database record, and later on, a copy of this transcription was printed in some German newspapers.
Glenn Greenwald confirmed that this information didn't came from the Snowden archive, and also Bruce Schneier was convinced that this came from a second source.

- Kanzler-Handy im US-Visier? Merkel beschwert sich bei Obama
- NSA-Überwachung: Merkels Handy steht seit 2002 auf US-Abhörliste

- Transcript of an NSA database record

Date of the document: ?

TAO's ANT product catalog

On December 29, 2013, the German magazine Der Spiegel published a 50-page catalog from the ANT-unit of NSA's hacking division TAO. It contains a wide range of sophisticated hacking and eavesdropping techniques. The next day, Jacob Appelbaum discussed them during his presentation at the CCC in Berlin.
According to Bruce Schneier this catalog came from the second source, who also leaked the Merkel tasking record and the XKEYSCORE rules.

- Shopping for Spy Gear: Catalog Advertises NSA Toolbox

- ANT Product Catalog (SECRET/COMINT)

Date of the document: 2008?


On July 3, 2014, the German regional television magazine Reporter disclosed the transcripts of a set of rules used by the NSA's XKEYSCORE system to automatically execute frequently used search terms, including correlating different identities of a certain target.
According to Bruce Schneier, these rules could be leaked by the second source, which also provided the Merkel tasking record and the TAO catalog.

- NSA targets the privacy-conscious

- Transcript of XKeyscore Rules (classification not included)

NCTC watchlisting guidance

On July 23, 2014, the website The Intercept published a manual from the US National CounterTerrorism Center (NCTC) with rules and indications used for putting people in terrorist databases and no-fly lists.
The Intercept says this document was provided by a "source within the intelligence community".

- The Secret Government Rulebook for Labeling You as a Terrorist

- March 2013 Watchlisting Guidance (UNCLASSIFIED/FOUO)

Date of the document: March 2013

NCTC terrorist watchlist report

On August 5, 2014, The Intercept published a report from the US National CounterTerrorism Center (NCTC) about terrorist watchlists and databases.
Just like the previous document, this was also obtained from a "source within the intelligence community". Bruce Schneier says this report is from August 2013, which is well after Snowden had fled the US, and therefore he assumes it was leaked by a third source.

- Watch Commander - Barack Obama’s Secret Terrorist-Tracking System, by the Numbers

- Directorate of Terrorist Identities (DTI) Strategic Accomplishments 2013 (SECRET/NOFORN)

Date of the document: August 2013

XKEYSCORE rules: New Zealand

On March 14 and March 22, 2015, The New Zealand Herald published transcripts of two sets of XKEYSCORE fingerprints that define targets of the New Zealand signals intelligence agency GCSB. They were not attributed to Snowden, although in the weeks before, New Zealand media published several other documents that did come from the Snowden cache.

- Revealed: The names NZ targeted using NSA's XKeyscore system
- How spy agency homed in on Groser's rivals

- Fingerprint about the WTO (TOP SECRET/COMINT)
- Fingerprint about the Solomon Islands (TOP SECRET/COMINT)

Date of the documents: January 6 & May 6, 2013

Ramstein AFB supporting drone operations

On April 17, 2015, The Intercept and Der Spiegel published a series of slides showing the infrastructure which is used for operating drones, for which the US base in Ramstein, Germany, acts as a relay station.
In the Citizen Four we see Glenn Greenwald visiting Snowden in Moscow, telling him there's a new source which revealed the role of Ramstein AFB in the drone program.

- Germany is the Tell-Tale Heart of America's Drone War
- Bündnisse: Der Krieg via Ramstein

- Architecture of U.S. Drone Operations (TOP SECRET/REL)

Date of the document: July 2012

NSA tasking & reporting: France

On June 23, 2015, Wikileaks, in collaboration with the French paper Libération, the German newspaper Süddeutsche Zeitung and the Italian paper l'Espresso, published the transcript of entries from an NSA tasking database, as well as intelligence reports about high-level French targets.

- Espionnage Élysée
- Nsa, intercettati i presidenti francesi Francois Hollande e Nicolas Sarkozy

- Top French NSA Targets (no classification available)
- Top French NSA Intercepts (up to TOP SECRET/COMINT-GAMMA)
- Economic Spy Order (SECRET/REL)

Timeframe of the documents: 2004 - July 31, 2012

NSA tasking & reporting: Germany

On July 1, 2015, Wikileaks, in collaboration with Libération and Mediapart, Süddeutsche Zeitung and l'Espresso, published the transcript of entries from an NSA tasking database, as well as intelligence reports about high-level German targets.

- NSA Helped CIA Outmanoeuvre Europe on Torture
- I dubbi di Angela Merkel sulla Grecia spiati dalla Nsa americana

- Top German NSA Targets (no classification available)
- Top German NSA Intercepts (up to TOP SECRET/COMINT-GAMMA)

Timeframe of the documents: 2005 - August 2011

NSA tasking & reporting: Brazil

On July 4, 2015, Wikileaks published the transcript of entries from an NSA tasking database about high-level Brazilian targets. Unlike similar disclosures about France, Germany and Japan, no intelligence reports about Brazil were disclosed.

- Bugging Brazil

- Top Brazilian NSA Targets (no classification available)

NSA tasking & reporting: Japan

On July 31, 2015, Wikileaks, in collaboration with Süddeutsche Zeitung, l'Espresso, The Saturday Paper from Australia and the Japanese newspaper Asahi Shimbun, published the transcript of entries from an NSA tasking database, as well as intelligence reports about high-level Japanese targets.

- Target Tokyo
- Wikileaks: 'Nsa spiava il governo giapponese. Sotto controllo anche Mitsubishi'

- Top Japanese NSA Targets (no classification available)
- Top Japanese NSA Intercepts (TOP SECRET/COMINT)

Timeframe of the documents: 2007 - 2009

Chinese cyber espionage against the US

On July 30 and August 10, 2015, NBC News published two slides about Chinese cyber espionage against over 600 US companies and government agencies, including access to the e-mail of top government officials since at least 2010.
This leak stands out because the slides are in digital form, and they support a story that shows the neccessity of NSA - which seems to point to an authorized leak.

- Exclusive: Secret NSA Map Shows China Cyber Attacks on U.S. Targets
- China Read Emails of Top U.S. Officials

- China: Cyber Exploitation and Attack Units (SECRET)
- U.S. Victims of Chinese Cyber Espionage (SECRET)

Date of the document: February 2014

XKEYSCORE agreement between NSA, BND and BfV

On August 26, 2015, the German newspaper Die Zeit published the transcript of the Terms of Reference (ToR) about the use of NSA's XKEYSCORE system by the German security service BfV.
Being a transcript and being about XKEYSCORE, this could be from the same source as the XKEYSCORE rules, but it's also possible it came from a source within a German government agency.

- A Dubious Deal with the NSA

- XKeyscore - the document (SECRET/COMINT)

Date of the document: April 2013

The Drone Papers

On October 15, 2015, The Intercept published a series of documents with details about drone operations by the US military between 2011 and 2013.
In the Citizen Four we see Glenn Greenwald visiting Snowden in Moscow, telling him there's a new source which revealed the role of Ramstein AFB in the drone program, including the chain of command diagram which is part of this batch of documents.

- The Assassination Complex
- The Kill Chain

- Small Footprint Operations 2/13 (SECRET/NOFORN)
- Small Footprint Operations 5/13 (SECRET/NOFORN)
- Operation Haymaker (SECRET/NOFORN)
- Geolocation Watchlist (TOP SECRET/COMINT)

Timeframe of the documents: 2011 - May 2013

Cellphone surveillance catalogue

On December 17, 2015, The Intercept published a range of pages from a classified catalogue containing cellphone surveillance equipment, including IMSI-catchers like Stingrays and DRT boxes.
Just like the NCTC reports, The Intercept obtained this document from a "source within the intelligence community".

- Stingrays - A Secret Catalogue of Government Gear for Spying on Your Cellphone

- Government Cellphone Surveillance Catalogue (SECRET/NOFORN)

Date of the document: after 2012

US military documents: Iraq and Afghanistan

On February 14, 2016, the website Cryptome published a batch of word and some pdf-documents containing various US military manuals and policy papers regarding operations and activities in Iraq and Afghanistan.

- Document Dump 16-0214, Batch 0001 (classified up to SECRET)

Timeframe of the documents:

NSA tasking & reporting: EU, Italy, UN

On February 23, 2016, Wikileaks published the transcript of entries from an NSA tasking database, as well as intelligence reports about high-level targets from the European Union, Italy and the United Nations, including German chancellor Merkel and Israeli prime minister Netanyahu.

- NSA Targets World Leaders for US Geopolitical Interests
- WikiLeaks reveals the NSA spied on Berlusconi and his closest advisors

- EU Targets - EU Intercepts (TOP SECRET/COMINT)
- Italy Targets - Italy Intercepts (TOP SECRET/COMINT)
- UN Targets - UN Intercepts (up to TOP SECRET/COMINT-GAMMA)

Timeframe of the documents: 2006 - 2011

TAO hacking tools (The Shadow Brokers)

On August 15, 2016, someone or a group called The Shadow Brokers published a large set of computer code attributed to the Equation Group, which is considered part of the NSA's TAO division. Many of these hacking tools affected hardware firewalls, from companies such as Cisco and Juniper.

- Everything you need to know about the NSA hack (but were afraid to Google)

- NSA malware files (.zip-file via Cryptome)

Timeframe of the documents: until October 18, 2013

FBI & CBP border intelligence gathering

On October 6, 2016, the website The Intercept published a set of documents and copies of presentation slides about how the FBI cooperates with US Customs and Border Protection (CBP) to gather intelligence from border controls.
These documents were provided by an "intelligence community source familiar with the process who is concerned about the FBI’s treatment of Muslim communities".

- The FBI’S Secret Methods for Recruiting Informants at the Border

- 14 documents, including presentation slides (Unclassified, SECRET and SECRET/NOFORN)

Timeframe of the documents: 2002 - December 2012

TAO IP addresses and domain names

On October 31, 2016, the Shadow Brokers published new files containing some more hacking tools and a list of 352 IP addresses and 306 domain names the Equation Group, considered part of NSA's TAO division, may have used for their operations.

- NSA Hackers The Shadow Brokers Dump More Files

- Trick or Treat (.zip-file via

Timeframe of the documents:

TAO Windows files

On January 12, 2017, the Shadow Brokers published a final message accompanied by 61 Windows-formatted binary files, including executables, dynamic link libraries, and device drivers, which are also considered to have been tools from the NSA's TAO hacking division.

- NSA-leaking Shadow Brokers lob Molotov cocktail before exiting world stage


Timeframe of the documents:

CIA hacking tools (Vault 7)

On March 7, 2017, Wikileaks published 8761 documents and files, including malware, viruses, trojans, weaponized "zero day" exploits, malware remote control systems and associated documentation, used to penetrate smartphones, smart televisions and computer systems. These files allegedly came from an high-security network inside the CIA's Center for Cyber Intelligence (CCI).

- Vault 7: CIA Hacking Tools Revealed

- Vault 7: Directory (up to SECRET/NOFORN)

Timeframe of the documents: 2013 - 2016

TAO Solaris exploits

On April 8, 2017, the Shadow Brokers were back and released the password for an encrypted data set released when they announced their file auction. The data set includes a range of exploits, including for the Unix operating system Solaris.

- They're Back: The Shadow Brokers Release More Alleged Exploits

- EQGRP Auction File

Timeframe of the documents: 2004 - ?

TAO Windows exploits + SWIFT files

On April 14, 2017, the Shadow Brokers published an archive containing a series of Windows exploits and documents about NSA's infiltration of the banking network SWIFT, for the first time including several Top Secret NSA powerpoint presentations, similar to those leaked by Snowden.

- Shadow Brokers Dump Alleged Windows Exploits and NSA Presentations on Targeting Banks
- The New Shadow Brokers Leak Connects the NSA to the Stuxnet Cyber Weapon Used on Iran

- EQGRP Lost in Translation (up to TOP SECRET/SI/NOFORN)

Timeframe of the documents: until October 17, 2013

It is difficult to tell exactly from how many different leakers these documents come. The journalists involved will of course do everything to hide their source's identity, including creating distraction and confusion, but also creating the impression that many other leakers followed the example of Edward Snowden.

Some thoughts on the form of the documents

Content-wise the documents from the alleged other sources are not very different from the ones from Snowden. But what seems to distinguish them most, is their form, which is either digital, a transcript or scanned from paper.


Almost all documents that were attributed to Snowden came in their original digital form (with some very few exceptions that were scanned from paper). This makes it remarkable that only two documents from the other sources are in a similar digital form.

The first one is the famous TAO Product Catalog with hacking and eavesdropping techniques, which also given its content comes closest to the Snowden documents. Despite that, this catalog was never attributed to him.

The other leak in digital form are the two slides about Chinese cyber espionage, but these probably come from a source in support of the US government.


A number of other leaks didn't provide documents in their original form, but only transcripts thereof. This is the case for the following revelations:
- Chancellor Merkel tasking record
- XKEYSCORE rules: New Zealand
- XKEYSCORE agreement between NSA, BND and BfV
The lists from an NSA tasking database with targets for France, Germany, Brazil and Japan are also transcripts, but for the intelligence reports, which Wikileaks published simultaneously, we have at least one example that is in its original format. All other ones came as transcripts.

Scanned from paper

All other documents that didn't came from Snowden look like they were printed out (some were even recognized as being double-sided) and scanned again. This is the case for:
- NCTC watchlisting guidance
- NCTC terrorist watchlist report
- Ramstein AFB supporting drone operations
- The Drone Papers
- Cellphone surveillance catalogue
- FBI & CBP border intelligence gathering
This doesn't automatically mean they are all from the same source, as two of them are from the civilian NCTC and the other three are clearly from a military context.

We don't know when or where these documents were printed out: maybe it was done by the leaker, for whom it could have been easier to exfiltrate them as hard copy, than on a detectable thumb drive.

It's also possible that they were printed out by the press contact in order to make them look different from the Snowden documents. But on the other hand, publishing them in digital form would have made it more difficult to prove they were not from the Snowden cache.

Some thoughts on the motives behind the leaks

We can also take a look at the motives that could have been behind these leaks. Interestingly, these seem to correspond quite well with the different forms the documents have.

A second source

The disclosures of the transcriptions of the XKEYSCORE rules and the tasking database lists are quite far from being in the public interest. They are about legitimate targets of foreign intelligence and publishing them seems solely meant to discredit the NSA and/or damage US foreign relationships.

The same applies to the TAO Product Catalog, which contains devices and methods that are only used against "hard targets" that cannot be reached by other means, so this is not about spying on ordinary citizens, but does compromise valid US intelligence operations.

At first sight, one would assume that these documents were from the Snowden cache, but published by people like Appelbaum and an organization like Wikileaks, who have a more radical approach than Snowden himself, and maybe therefore could have pretended they came from another source.

However, both Greenwald and security expert Bruce Schneier said these documents were really provided by another leaker. Because a number of them were published by German media, Schneier guesses it might be "either an NSA employee or contractor working in Germany, or someone from German intelligence who has access to NSA documents".

If that's the case, then it's not only remarkable that there's a second source from within or close to NSA, but also that this source is apparently fine with leaking documents that show no abuses, but only seriously harm US interests - which is either treason, or the work of a hostile intelligence agency. Snowden at least acted from his concern about increasing mass surveillance on innocent civilians.

So far, the last publication that can be attributed to the Second Source were the NSA tasking & reporting files in February 2016. Then in August of that year, someone or a group who called themselves The Shadow Brokers, started a series of leaks, mainly of TAO hacking tools. They are published without an intermediary like media outlets or Wikileaks. The Shadow Brokers leaks undermine NSA operations in a similar way as those of the Second Source, so it's vey well possible that the same person is behind both series of leaks. Also interesting is that the latest timestamp found in the Shadow Brokers files is October 18, 2013, which is around the same time the first leak from the Second Source came out.

A third source

The documents that are scanned from paper are a somewhat different story. These are about issues that concern a wider range of people. For some of them, The Intercept even gives the reason why the source leaked them: for the cellphone surveillance catalogue it was because of a concern about militarization of domestic law enforcement.

For the drone papers, the source is cited saying: "This outrageous explosion of watchlisting [...] assigning them death sentences without notice, on a worldwide battlefield". Given that he mentions watchlists, it seems very well possible that this source actually also leaked the two NCTC reports about terrorist databases and watchlists.

Combining this with the fact that both the NCTC reports and the cellphone surveillance catalog were from a source "within the intelligence community" seems to confirm that all the documents that came as scanned from paper are from the same leaker - maybe someone from a military intelligence agency like the DIA.

Also from an "intelligence community source" are several FBI & CBP documents about intelligence gathering at US border controls - something that is also closely related to watchlisting.


Given these thoughts on the form of the leaked documents and the possible motives behind these leaks, it seems that they can be attributed to at least three other sources, beside Snowden:

Source nr. 1 (Edward Snowden)

Source nr. 2 (NSA insider and/or hostile intelligence?)
- Chancellor Merkel tasking record
- TAO product catalog
- XKEYSCORE rules: New Zealand
- NSA tasking & reporting France, Germany, Brazil, Japan
- XKEYSCORE agreement between NSA, BND and BfV(?)
- NSA tasking & reporting EU, Italy, UN
Source nr. 3 (someone from US military intelligence?)
- NCTC watchlisting guidance
- NCTC terrorist watchlist report
- Ramstein AFB supporting drone operations
- The Drone Papers
- Cellphone surveillance catalogue
- FBI & CBP border intelligence gathering
Source nr. 4 (on behalf of the US government?)
- Chinese cyber espionage
Source nr. 5 (low-level military person)
- US military documents: Iraq and Afghanistan
Source nr. 6 ("The Shadow Brokers")
- TAO hacking tools
- TAO IP addresses and domain names
- TAO Windows files
- TAO Solaris exploits
- TAO Windows exploits + SWIFT files
Source nr. 7 (someone inside CIA?)
- CIA hacking tools (Vault 7)


On October 6, 2016, The New York Times reported that on August 27, 2016, the FBI arrested 51-year old Harold T. Martin III, who worked at NSA as a contractor for Booz Allen Hamilton. He was described as a hoarder and on February 8, 2017 he was only indicted on charges of stealing and retaining the largest heist of classified information in US history: from the 1990s until 2016, he took documents from US Cyber Command, CIA, National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) and NSA. Martin was not accused of passing information to foreigners, nor of being the source for the Shadow Brokers publications.

On November 19, it was reported by the Washington Post that there had been yet another, previously undisclosed breach of cybertools, which was discovered in the summer of 2015. This was also carried out by a TAO employee, who had also been arrested, but his case was not made public. An official said that it is not believed that this individual shared the material with another country.

On April 20, 2017, CBS News reported that CIA and FBI started a joint investigation into the leak of the CIA hacking tools that were published by Wikileaks under the name "Vault 7". Investigators are apparently looking for an insider, either a CIA employee or contractor, who had physical access to the material.

So, besides the various sources who stole classified material that was leaked to the public, there are at least the following people who stole documents that were apparently NOT published:

Thief nr. 1 (Harold T. Martin III)
- Classified documents from multiple agencies
Thief nr. 2 (unnamed TAO employee)
- TAO cybertools

Links and Sources
- Trove of Stolen NSA Data Is ‘Devastating’ Loss for Intelligence Community (2017)
- Weaponized Wikileaks: Nick Reads Wikileaks So You Don't Have To (2015)
- The US Intelligence Community has a Third Leaker (2014)

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December 6, 2015

How NSA targeted the Venezuelan oil company PdVSA

There aren't many new revelations from the Snowden-documents anymore, but recently an NSA document was published telling how the agency prepared the interception of communications from the Venezuelan oil company Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PdVSA).

It's not a very spectacular disclosure, but it gives a nice insight in what an NSA analyst actually does. The story was published on November 18 by the website The Intercept and the Latin-American broadcaster teleSUR.

Most people will have read The Intercept's report, but that misses one of the most interesting details of the story. Here, the disclosed NSA document will be discussed in full, with details explained based upon information from earlier disclosures.

Building of PdVSA in Maracaibo with on its facade Fidel Castro's motto
"Patria, Socialismo o Muerte" (Fatherland, Socialism or Death)
(Photo: Reportero24)

The document that was published is an excerpt from SIDtoday, the internal newsletter of the NSA's Signals Intelligence Division from March 23, 2011 (which was apparently accessed (by Snowden?) on Saturday, November 10, 2012). It contains a story that is told by a Signals Intelligence Development (SIGDEV) analyst from the NSA's Transnational & Strategic Partnerships SIGDEV branch.

A SIGDEV analyst is someone who looks for new targets or new means to access communications of existing targets. His unit S2C13 is part of the International Security Issues (ISI) Product Line, which is responsible for analysis and production of intelligence about countries in Europe, South-America and elsewhere.

Intelligence requirements

As the analyst recalls, a year-end review had shown that there was no progress on the "Venezuelan Energy target set" as most reporting came from warranted collection. That could refer to PRISM and Upstream collection under section 702 FAA, but that only requires annual certifications approved by the FISA Court. Strictly spoken, individual warrants are only needed for "traditional FISA" collection, like for example for eavesdropping on the Venezuelan embassy in Washington.

The analyst decided to do a "target reboot", which he describes as "taking a fresh look at opportunities for collection". He first looked at specific Information Needs (INs) and used SURREY, which is the main NSA requirements database.

These requirements are the outcome of an administrative process, that starts with the US president setting the highest priorities for foreign intelligence collection. These priorities are then translated into the National Intelligence Priorities Framework (NIPF) for the US Intelligence Community as a whole.

Strategic Mission List

For Signals Intelligence (SIGINT), it's the National Signals Intelligence Committee (SIGCOM) that collects the requests for information from the various intelligence "consumers", checks whether they are consistent with the NIPF and assignes them a priority. An overview of the SIGINT priorities can be found in the 2007 Strategic Mission List, which was published in November 2013.

This document lists Venezuela as one of six countries that are treated as "enduring targets". According to this document, NSA should "Provide U.S. decision makers with a holistic SIGINT perspective of regional trends and developments" and also "Provide indicators of regime stability, particularly in the energy sector":

Section about Venezuela in the 2007 Strategic Mission List
(Click to enlarge)

Economic or commercial espionage?

The Intercept makes a point out of NSA targeting a petroleum company "for economic espionage" - earlier disclosures had already brought up the names of the Brazilian company Petrobras and Gazprom from Russia. Why that should be a problem isn't explained however: all three companies are government-controlled and oil is an issue of strategic interest for almost any country.

The website also cites US Director of National Intelligence James Clapper, who explained the difference between gathering intelligence on economic issues for government policy makers (which the US admits doing), and stealing trade secrets of foreign companies to help individual American corporations (which the US strongly denies doing). And in this case, there's (again) no evidence for the latter.


The story of the analyst then continues with that he met with the Target Office of Primary Interest (TOPI) responsible for Venezuelan targets, in order to "re-assure myself that we were both on the same page in regards to our goals". A TOPI consists of analysts who analyse the communications that come in as a result of the collection process and who prepare the intelligence reports.

These first steps show that NSA analysts work within a bureaucratic framework that requires collaboration with colleagues and superiors who make sure their activities are in accordance with the goals set by the government - as a rule, they're not free to target anyone at will, which is the impression people can get when listening to Edward Snowden.

Get started

The TOPI analyst wanted information from the highest level of PdVSA, i.e. from the president and members of the Board of Directors, as much of it as possible in the form of internet communications, which, unlike phone calls, don't have to be transcribed. Also there was no time for "extensive target development".

Then the SIGDEV analyst started his work. He first visited the PdVSA website on the internet for the names of the Board of Directors. He put them into a new document in Analyst's Notebook, which is an analysis tool widely used by intelligence and law enforcement agencies all over the world.

Demonstration of a "Pattern-of-Life Analysis" using Analyst's Notebook

Sigint already-collected

The next step was looking at what had already been collected about his targets. For this he first accessed the PINWALE database, which is NSA's main repository for all kinds internet content that was collected by using specific selectors (i.e. no bulk content collection).

A few queries, using the names he had found on the website, returned not much of interest: a lot of e-mails in which these persons were "cc-ed", but hardly anything to or from them personally. This also provided some e-mail addresses, but the analyst already knew these.

He entered the mail addresses into CADENCE, which is NSA's tasking tool for internet communications, and also into the Unified Targeting Tool (UTT). This would show whether these e-mail addreses were already tasked, which means whether the actual collection facilities had been instructed to collect the related communications.

Finding new selectors

Apparently collection against PdVSA did take place in the past, as PINWALE kept providing documents containing the target's names. This weren't communications, but some kind of information forms with contact details and organizational information about PdVSA employees.

The analyst says that these forms were similar to what is in NSA's SEARCHLIGHT database, which is the agency's internal personnel information system. As these information forms mention who within PdVSA is somebody's supervisor, they resulted in a whole tree of entries and names:

Internal PdVSA information form which shows president of the board
Rafael Ramirez as supervisor of another board member, Luis Vierma

Lots of them

The new selectors include business and private e-mail addresses and work, home and cell phone numbers. The newly found e-mail addresses could again be entered into CADENCE and the UTT, while the phone numbers could be used to enter them in OCTAVE, which is NSA's tasking tool to initiate the interception of telephone conversations. It's not said whether this happened or not - the TOPI analyst at least didn't prefer phone calls.

The Intercept writes that NSA apparently "collects so much communications data from around the world that it often fails to realize what it has". This however applies to most intelligence and law enforcement agencies that conduct automated eavesdropping: there are often way too many phone calls to listen in to, let alone digital communications to translate, read and analyse.

Internal network

When the SIGDEV analyst was analysing the PdVSA forms (of which there were over 10.000 in the PINWALE database), he discovered that they all came from IP addresses starting with 10.x.x.x and 172.18.x.x, which are from address ranges that are reserved for use within private networks. The analyst now realised these entries came from the internal PdVSA network, and not from communications over the public internet.

One of the most interesting details of this whole story is how NSA had been able to get access to PdVSA's internal network - which isn't told in the report by The Intercept, but only in the one from teleSUR...

Front side of the US embassy in Caracas, Venezuela
(Photo: Yongo @

Special Collection Service

After the analyst discovered that he was looking at information from the internal PdVSA network, he "fired off a few emails to F6 here and in Caracas, and they confirmed it!"

F6 is the NSA's internal designator for the Special Collection Service (SCS) units in which specialists from NSA and CIA cooperate against targets that require "close access". These units operate out of some 80 US embassies all over the world.

This means it was the SCS unit from the US embassy in Caracas that had been able to get access to the internal network of PdVSA. The story doesn't tell how they did this, but probably they found a way to secretly tap a network cable or switch over which the oil company's computer network runs. If this access was still active, it has now has certainly been compromised.

SCS operations

From an earlier revelation we know that the SCS unit in the US embassy in Berlin was responsible for eavesdropping on the (non-secure) mobile phone of German chancellor Merkel. Maybe that was also done by tapping a local telephone network, or by just intercepting the cell phone's airwave signals.

For such wireless interception operations, many US embassies have a rooftop structure that conceals sophisticated antenna and other eavesdropping equipment. Such a structure is also clearly visible on the roof of the US embassy in Caracas:

Back side of the US embassy in Caracas, with the rooftop structure
(Photo: Carlos Garcia Rawlins/Reuters - Click to enlarge)


After finding out the source of those PdVSA forms, the SIGDEV analyst started to coordinate his work with the F6 unit in Caracas. Apparently they fed data from their network access into XKEYSCORE, which is NSA's system to buffer, index and search internet communications, not only from large submarine cables, but also from smaller accesses, like from the SCS units.

This enabled the analyst at NSA headquarters to search through a rolling buffer of several days worth of content, which is especially useful to find files which aren't directly associated with hard selectors like e-mail addresses.

This resulted in "several juicy pdf documents" and one of them was eventually used for preparing a serialized report (number 3/OO/505480-11) dated January 2011 and titled "Venezuela State-Owned Oil Company Information Shows a Decrease in Overall Oil Thefts and Losses" - which doesn't sound like a trade secret that would benefit individual US oil companies, but on the other hand shows that such high-level accesses are also used for rather general intelligence information.

Hacking opportunities

Through XKEYSCORE, the analyst also found over 900 username and password combinations of PdVSA employees, which he handed over to NSA's hacking division, Tailored Access Operations (TAO). With a username and password one doesn't have to "break in" into a network, which makes the access almost impossible to detect.

The analyst also provided TAO with some other data along with a targeting request, especially aimed at getting access to the e-mail boxes of the PdVSA board members.

It is not known whether this was successful, but The Intercept and teleSUR mention that in May 2011, which is two months after the analyst's story in SIDtoday, the US State Department announced sanctions to be imposed on PdVSA because it had delivered at least two cargoes of reformate (used to produce gasoline) to Iran between December 2010 and March 2011, worth approximately $ 50 million.

> See also: An NSA eavesdropping case study about targeting the presidents of Mexico and Brazil.

November 22, 2015

Unnoticed leak answers and raises questions about operation Eikonal

(Last edited: November 23, 2015)

Almost unnoticed, the Austrian member of parliament Peter Pilz recently disclosed new information about operation Eikonal, under which NSA and BND cooperated in tapping some fiber-optic cables at a switching center of Deutsche Telekom in Frankfurt, Germany.

As part of the NSA umbrella program RAMPART-A, Eikonal was set up to gather intelligence about targets from Russia, the Middle East and North-Africa. Because the cables that were tapped came also from countries like Austria, Switzerland, France, Belgium and the Netherlands, there were fears that their communications were intercepted too.

Here, the newly disclosed information will be discussed and combined with things we learned from the hearings of the German parliamentary commission that investigates NSA spying, including operation Eikonal.

Overview of the joint NSA-BND operation Eikonal (2004-2008)
(Click to enlarge)


The new information comes from transcripts of some fax and e-mail messages from employees of BND, Deutsche Telekom and the federal Chancellery, which Peter Pilz published on his website on October 23, 2015.

He never told how he got these highly sensitive documents, but as they were made available to the parliamentary inquiry commission, it seems most likely someone from or very close to this commission must have leaked them to Pilz. Strangely enough, this leak was never investigated.

Media attention

Also remarkable is that the information and documents disclosed by Peter Pilz were almost completely ignored by mainstream German media like ARD and ZDF and the major newspapers. The latest disclosure was for example only reported by the Austrian paper Der Standard and the German tech website

By contrast, in neighbouring countries like Austria, Belgium and the Netherlands, the Pilz revelations were big news and led to official investigations. Through May and June of this year, he had published lists of communication links related to Switzerland, France, Luxembourg and Poland too, claiming they showed to what extent BND and NSA spied upon these countries.

First part of the list with communication links related to France
(Source: Peter Pilz - Click to enlarge)

Whose's links?

Initially, Peter Pilz claimed these links were from a priority list of the NSA, but neither he, nor the commission hearings could clearly confirm this. The Dutch website De Correspondent reported that there was even a much larger list of some 1000 transit links, of which ca. 250 were marked in yellow.

Now, Pilz confirms that there's indeed such a large list: it was prepared by Deutsche Telekom and contains all its 1028 transit links. Employees of BND had marked 256 of them in yellow, apparently the ones they were most interested in, and hence the list became known as the BND priority list. He doesn't mention an involvement of NSA at this stage anymore.

Now that we know the large list of over 1000 links isn't an even larger "wish list", but a list of all available transit links, it could well be that BND tried to select around 20% of them, as a rather strange provision in German law says that bulk collection is only allowed up to a maximum of 20% of a cable's capacity.

As Telekom Austria rented the channels to Vienna, we can assume that other national telecommunication providers also rented their links to Frankfurt, with Deutsche Telekom being the owner of the cables as part of their international backbone network.

Determining the access points

After BND selected the 256 channels, Deutsche Telekom had to look which of them ran through Frankfurt and could be intercepted there. For this purpose Harald Helfrich of the lawful interception unit of Deutsche Telekom AG (DTAG) sent his collegue mr. Tieger the following e-mail on September 16, 2003:

Hallo LK,

wie heute morgen besprochen übersende ich Ihnen die Liste der Transit-Leitungen der DTAG. Wir bitten Sie die gelb unterlegten Verbindungen bzgl. ihrer Führung (z.B. Ffm 21 oder Norden-Nordeich) und ob in der 2-Mb-Ebene greifbar, zu analysieren.

Anlage: Trans mit ausgesuchten Strecken

In this mail it is asked to analyse whether the transit channels marked in yellow can be intercepted at the 2 Mbit-level, either at Deutsche Telekom's Frankfurt am Main Point-of-Presence 21 (Ffm 21) or at Norden-Norddeich.

The latter is a town at the northern coast of Germany, where the SeaMeWe-3 and TAT-14 submarine cables land. For the parliamentary commission this was a reason to ask whether also cables where intercepted over there, but that was strongly denied by the witnesses involved.

Selecting individual channels?

Interestingly, the phrase "ob in der 2-Mb-Ebene greifbar" suggests that it could be possible to just intercept specific 2 Mbit/s channels while leaving the other ones untouched (one physical STM1-cable has a data rate of 155 Mbit/s and contains 63 virtual channels).

Whether this is possible is important for how focused such cable tapping can be. Isolating individual channels depends in the first place on where exactly the tapping takes place:

A. When the physical fiber is intercepted before it reaches the switch, it has to be bend in order to catch the light that leaks. Because this leaking signal is much weaker, it has to be amplified before it can be processed. In this way it's not possible to select individual channels: the eavesdropper gets everything that runs over the fiber, and has to demultiplex the channels himself to select the ones that contain traffic of interest.

Splitting a traffic from a fiber-optic cable by bowing it
(diagram: OSA Publishing, slightly simplified)

B. When the interception takes place at an optical switch itself, then it's possible to only grab the virtual channels you are interested in. A physical cable contains channels which have to be demultiplexed at the switch in order to be forwarded (switched) to the fiber that leads to the intended destination. When the switch converts the optical signals into electronic signals it is even more easy to duplicate only individual channels of interest.

Diagram showing (de)multiplexing at a fiber-optic switch
(diagram modified from Wikimedia Commons/Jflabourdette)

Different methods

During the commission hearing of March 26, 2015, Klaus Landefeld, board member of the DE-CIX internet exchange, indicated that at least since 2009, interception takes place at the switch. Also, the so-called G10-orders authorise interception based upon Autonomous System Numbers (ASN) which are used for logical paths, rather than by naming physical cables to or from a certain city.

However, it seems that under operation Eikonal, the fiber-optic cables were tapped by splitting the cable signal before it reached the switch. This was more or less clearly indicated by several witnesses heard by the parliamentary commission, and there are several other indications too.

In 2004, it was apparently not yet possible to establish a tap at the switch itself to get access to individual channels (although Deutsche Telekom could have demultiplexed the fiber and only forward the channels of interest to BND, but this wasn't the case).

Government authorisation

After BND had made clear what they wanted, the Deutsche Telekom management wasn't sure whether such cable access was legal. Therefore they wanted to be backed by the federal Chancellery. On December 30, 2003, the coordinator for the intelligence services at the Chancellery, Ernst Uhrlau, sent the following fax message to Kai-Uwe Ricke, then CEO of Deutsche Telekom, and Josef Brauner, head of the landline division T-Com:

Sehr geehrter Herr Ricke, sehr geehrter Herr Brauner,

das Bundeskanzleramt ist sehr interessiert, dass der Bundesnachrichtendienst im Rahmen seines gesetzlichen Auftrages kabelgestützte Transitverkehre aufklärt. Der vom Bundesnachrichtendienst in Ihrem Unternehmen geplante Aufklärungsansatz steht aus hiesiger Sicht in Einklang mit geltendem Recht.

Ich darf auf diesem Weg die Anregung des Bundesnachrichtendienstes weitergeben, in der Deutschen Telekom AG, T-Com, den Bereich RA 43 (Staatliche Sonderauflagen), zu dem bereits im Rahmen der Strategischen Fernmeldekontrolle Kontakte bestehen, mit der Durchführung der auf Seiten der Deutschen Telekom AG erforderlichen Maßnahmen zu beauftragen.

It says that in the opinion of the Chancellery, the proposed BND operation is according to German law. The Chancellery encourages Deutsche Telekom to instruct its lawful intercept unit RA 43 (which is one of four Regionalstellen für staatliche Sonderauflagen or ReSA) to start taking the necessary measures for the interception.

Transit Agreement

On behalf of the board of Deutsche Telekom, Josef Brauner answers the fax from the Chancellery on January 13, 2004. He says the T-Com division is aware of the importance of a well-functioning intelligence service, and will therefore support the interception of cable-bound transit traffic:

Sehr geehrter Herr Ministerialdirektor,

gerne bestätigen wir Ihnen den Erhalt Ihres Schreibens vom 30. Dezember des letzten Jahres.

Die T-Com ist sich der Bedeutung eines gut funktionierenden Nachrichtendienstes für das Gemeinwesen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland - insbesondere vor dem Hintergrund der terroristischen Angriffe des 11. September 2001 - bewusst und wird daher die geplanten Aktivitäten des Bundesnachrichtendienstes, die kabelgestützten Transitverkehre im Rahmen seines gesetzlichen Auftrages aufzuklären, unterstützen.

Entsprechend der Anregung des Bundesnachrichtendienstes wird diesseits unser Bereich RA43 (staatliche Sonderauflagen) beauftragt, die hierfür von unserer Seite erforderlichen Maßnahmen vorzunehmen

Then on March 1, 2004, the BND and Deutsche Telekom signed the so-called Transit Agreement (pdf), in which the latter agreed to provide access to its transit cables, and in return will be paid 6.500,- euro a month for the expenses. This agreement was also leaked to Peter Pilz, who published it on May 18, 2015 in the Austrian tabloid paper Kronen Zeitung.

Preparing for collection

After the agreement had been signed, BND sent an e-mail on March 9, 2004 to Wolfgang Alster, head of Deutsche Telekom's lawful interception unit RA 43 asking for the connection (schaltung) of the first communication links. He adds that he had ordered the payment of the first two monthly payments:



Hallo Herr Alster,

Der Geschäftsbesorgungsvertrag "Transit" ist ja jetzt von beiden Seiten unterzeichnet und gestern habe ich die beiden ersten Monatszahlungen veranlasst.

Daher erdreiste ich mich, Sie um die erste Schaltung von Leitungen zu bitten.

Realising the access was apparently not that easy, because it took until December 2004 before the first cable was connected. Then it appeared that it's signal was too weak, so in January 2005 an amplifier was installed - as the parliamentary commission was told by S.L., who was the BND project manager for Eikonal (note that the use of an amplifier indicates tapping the entire fiber-optic cable).

At this first stage of operation Eikonal, only circuit-switched (Leitungsvermittelte) telephone communications were intercepted. Collection of packet-switched (Paketvermittelte) internet communications started in 2006 (see below).


On February 3, 2005, mr. Knau mailed his colleague Harald Helfrich at the RA 43 unit that an STM1-link between switching center Frankfurt 21 and Luxembourg had been connected. Channels 2, 6, 14, and 50 contained the virtual channels that had Luxembourg as their endpoint:

Hallo Herr Helfrich,

Habe heute früh die o.g. Verbindung auf die Punkte 71/00/002/03 19 + 39 zugeschaltet. In der Anlage ist die Belegung lt. RUBIN ersichtlich.

Auf den Kanälen 2, 6, 14, 50 befinden sich die in der Liste markierten DSVn mit der Endstelle Luxembourg.

Bitte um Rückmeldung ob das ganze funktioniert.

Anlage: Belegung 7571 Luxbg

We also see the term RUBIN (German for ruby), and during the commission hearings it seemed that this was an alternate codename for operation Eikonal. But when heard on January 15, 2015, Harald Helfrich explained that RUBIN is actually a system that Deutsche Telekom uses to manage its communication links and cables - which perfectly fits how the term is used in this e-mail.

Channels of interest

The next e-mail is also from February 3, 2005, but was already published by Peter Pilz on May 15, 2015 and is the only one that is available in what seems to be its original form. It's from Harald Helfrich, who informs a mr. Siegert at the BND that mr. Knau had connected an STM1-link earlier that morning (see previous e-mail). He says it contains the channels that were on the BND priority list:

This e-mail says that BND was interested in the following 2 Mbit/s channels from the Transit STM1-cable "Ffm 21 - Luxembourg 757/1":
Channel 2: Luxembourg/VG - Wien/000 750/3
Channel 6: Luxembourg/CLUX - Moscow/CROS 750/1
Channel 14: Ankara/CTÜR - Luxembourg/CLUX 750/1
Channel 50: Luxembourg/VG - Prague/000 750/1

According to Peter Pilz, additional cables were connected on February 14 and 25, as well as on March 3, 2005. Unfortunately, he either doesn't possess or didn't disclose the related e-mails, so we still don't know how many and which channels have actually been intercepted.

The interception of telephony communications therefore started in the Spring of 2005, which means that collection under Eikonal only lasted for 3 years, and not 4 years, when one would count from signing the agreement in 2004 until the end of the operation in 2008.

Ending telephone interception

Peter Pilz published the transcripts of two more e-mails, which are about ending the telephone interception. On May 27, 2008, mr. Thorwald from Deutsche Telekom sent the following message to his colleague Harald Helfrich, informing him that fully circuit-switched transit traffic isn't supported anymore. Therefore, the extraction of transit traffic at the company's premises can be terminated:

Sehr geehrter Herr Helfrich,

Wie wir bereits telefonisch besprochen, teile ich Ihnen mit, dass die Verarbeitung von reinen leitungsvermittelten "Transit-Verkehren" von uns nicht mehr durchgeführt wird.

Aus diesem Grund kann die Ableitung der Transit-Verkehre in unseren Betriebsräumen eingestellt werden.

Im leitungsvermittelten Bereich (Ableitung auf höherer Ebene) besteht aktuell der Bedarf zur Ableitung von folgenden Verkehren:

+ 2 x STM-64
+ 4 x STM-16

After that, Thorwald writes that there's currently a need to extract the traffic of two STM-64 and four STM-16 cables, which have a data rate of ca. 10 Gbit/s and 2,5 Gbit/s respectively. This is also said to be circuit-switched, but "extraction at a higher level".


If we assume that Peter Pilz provided the correct date for this e-mail, it's strange that there was apparently a need for new cable accesses, hardly a month before operation Eikonal was officially terminated (June 2008).

Even more strange is that the e-mail says the new accesses are also circuit-switched (leitungsvermittelt), while during the hearings it was testified that the collection of such telephone communications ended in January 2007, after Deutsche Telekom fased-out its business model for dedicated transit cables. This e-mail brings that message almost 1,5 years later!

Internet access

From the commission hearings we also learned that BND wanted access to internet traffic too, which is packet-switched (Paketvermittelt). For this, the first cable became available by the end of 2005, but it took some months before the backlink was also connected. In the spring of 2006 a second cable was added, and the front-end system and the filters were tested until mid-2007.

Could it be that mr. Thorwald just made a mistake, and wrote "leitungsvermittelten" where he meant "paketvermittelten"? But even then, why add new internet cables, just before the operation was ended?

Another question

A similar anomaly can be found in an e-mail, that according to Peter Pilz, was sent one day later, on May 28, 2008. In it, mr. Knau informed Harald Helfrich and his superior Wolfgang Alster that the access to four STM1-cables can be terminated immediately.

Given what was said during the commission hearings, one would have expected that this also had happened already in January 2007, instead of May 2008. It seems some things don't add up here.

Wie bereits fernmündlich besprochen, können nachfolgende STM1-Zuschaltungen mit sofortiger Wirkung aufgehoben werden:

Ffm 21 - Stuttgart 10 757/22A
Ffm 21 - Paris 757/1
Ffm 21 - Reims 757/1
Ffm 21 - Luxembourg 757/1

Physical cables

Unlike the numerous virtual channels in the lists, this e-mail is about physical cables. "Ffm 21 - Luxembourg 757/1" is the one mentioned in the e-mail from February 3, 2005, containing 4 channels of interest to Luxembourg; the others are cables from Frankfurt (Ffm) to Reims, Paris, and Deutsche Telekom's Point-of-Presence in Stuttgart. With this, we now have proof of 3 other cables having been tapped.

According to a list (.docx) publiced by Peter Pilz, there are 29 channels to/from Reims and 22 channels to/from Paris, all of which could easily have been in the fiber-optic cable between Frankfurt and Reims, and Frankfurt and Paris, respectively, as one single STM1-cable contains 63 separate channels:
Frankfurt - Stuttgart: ? channels of interest
Frankfurt - Paris: 22 channels of interest
Frankfurt - Reims: 29 channels of interest
Frankfurt - Luxembourg: 11 channels of interest

Peter Pilz concludes that operation Eikonal was the start of NSA's illegal mass surveillance of European telecommunications. But that's not supported by evidence. After Eikonal, NSA continued joint cable tapping operations with BND and other European agencies, but as these programs are part of RAMPART-A, they are mainly aimed at specific targets in Russia, North-Africa and the Middle East.*

BND cable tapping

Operation Eikonal did start something else though: it provided BND with the knowledge and the experience for conducting cable tapping on its own: in 2009 they started intercepting cables from 25 internet service providers, this time at the DE-CIX internet exchange in Frankfurt - as was revealed by Der Spiegel on October 6, 2013.

Among these 25 providers are foreign companies from Russia, Central Asia, the Middle East and North Africa, but also 6 German providers: 1&1, Freenet, Strato AG, QSC, Lambdanet and Plusserver, who almost exclusively handle domestic traffic.

It appears that this interception takes place in cooperation with the DE-CIX Management and that the various providers themselves didn't knew that this was happening. A smart move, as this provides BND with just one single point-of-contact, while the indivual providers can honestly deny that their cables are being intercepted.

Links and sources
- BND-Operation Eikonal: "Freibrief" für die Telekom aus dem Kanzleramt
- Pilz: Berlin genehmigte NSA-Spionage gegen Österreich
- "Ich darf die Anregung weitergeben..." Die Operation Transit in Europa

November 3, 2015

New details about the selectors NSA provided to BND

(Updated: August 24, 2016)

Since last Spring, the German parliamentary commission investigating NSA spying is trying to find out whether the Americans secretly tried to spy on German and European targets.

During the hearings it became clear that the German foreign intelligence service BND wasn't able to fully prevent that selectors, like e-mail addresses and phone numbers, provided by the NSA, were fed into the collection system.

A special investigator was allowed access to the lists of rejected selectors and he reported about his findings last week. Here follows the background of this affair and the most important and interesting details from the investigation report.

> Many more details pieced together from the commission hearings can be found here

The BND satellite intercept station at Bad Aibling, Germany
(Photo: AFP/Getty Images)

Satellite interception

The origins of the selector affair go back to 2004, when the Americans turned their satellite intercept station Bad Aibling over to German intelligence. In return, BND had to share the results from its satellite collection with the NSA, for which the latter provided selectors, like e-mail addresses, phone numbers, etc. of the targets they were interested in.

Besides the satellite interception, Bad Aibling was also involved in cable tapping, but only under operation Eikonal (2004-2008), which was limited to cables from Deutsche Telekom in Frankfurt.

Until 2013, NSA is said to have provided some 690.000 phone numbers and 7,8 million internet identifiers. As a foreign intelligence service, BND is not allowed to collect German communications, let alone hand them over to NSA. In order to prevent that, BND tried to check all these selectors, initially by hand, but since 2008 by using a automated filter system called DAFIS.

Blocking German selectors

During a number of tough and lengthy hearings of the parliamentary commission that investigates NSA spying, BND employees had to admit that DAFIS was only able to defeat selectors that were clearly recognizable as belonging to Germans, like mail addresses ending with .de or phone numbers starting with (00)49.

There was hardly any effort to sort out selectors related to other European countries. Also the foreign e-mail addresses, like from Hotmail or Google, used by Germans were only blocked when someone at BND stumbled upon them. Although these kind of selectors could have been blocked more systematically, it's impossible to enter all relevant ones into the DAFIS filter.

This means, when NSA targeted such foreign addresses, the chances they were rejected by DAFIS are not very high and will therefore have been activated on the collection system. Such selectors went into the tasking database, without practicable or reliable means to identify and block them.

Rejected selectors

When the DAFIS system found recognizable German selectors, they were marked as disapproved and not entered into the collection system, so they could not lead to any results.

Initially it seemed that these rejected selectors were put into a separate repository (German: Ablehnungsdatei, also Ausschussliste), but actually they stayed in the tasking databases and were only extracted for the purpose of the parliamentary inquiry.

This resulted in a list of almost 40.000 rejected selectors. An investigation by BND employee Dr. T. in August 2013, revealed almost 2000 e-mail selectors that had been activated, but now seemed politically sensitive. A simultaneous investigation by W.O. resulted in over 10.000 e-mail selectors belonging to European government agencies.

Overview of the dataflow for the NSA-BND cooperation at Bad Aibling
(Click to enlarge)

Special investigator

Members of the parliamentary investigation commission were eager to see those selectors, but they are sensitive and classified, so the government denied them access. Finally, a compromise was made, under which an independent special investigator was allowed to examine the lists of rejected and suspicious selectors and report back to the commission, without disclosing individual targets.

The coalition parties agreed upon Dr. Kurt Graulich, a former judge at the Federal Administrative Court, for this job. During the past 4 months he examined the selector lists and finished his investigation on October 23 with a report, which was presented in three versions on October 29:
- A classified report for the federal government
- A classified report for the commission
- A public report (263 pages pdf)

Report by special investigator Dr. Kurt Graulich
(Click for the full report in .pdf)

Selector lists

Special investigator Graulich examined the following lists (German: Liste) of selectors that had been rejected by the DAFIS filter, or sorted out by hand because they were considered politically sensitive:

a. The Ablehnungsliste, containing 39.082 selectors (2.918 from the telephony and 36.164 from the internet tasking database) from 2005 till March 2015.

Including most parts of:
b. The 2000er-Liste, containing 1.826 e-mail selectors, which were found in August 2013 by Dr. T. and subsequently marked as disapproved.

c. The 2005er-Liste, containing 74 telephone selectors (52 belonging to EADS, 22 to Eurocopter), which were found by the end of 2005 and were marked as disapproved in January 2006.

d. The Nachfund 1, containing several lists with a total of 444 telephone selectors that were found by semi-manual checks in 2007 and were all marked as disapproved.

e. Not available anymore were between 10.000 and 12.000 e-mail selectors that were found by BND employee W.O. when he checked the tasking database for terms related to European government agencies. He found results for 18 EU member countries and these selectors were marked as disapproved.

Types of selectors

By examining the largest list of rejected selectors (Ablehnungsliste), Dr. Graulich found that it contains the following types of selectors:
For telephony:
- IMSI: Numbers of cell phone SIM cards
- IMEI: Numbers of cell phone devices
- SCREENNAMES: User names or numbers, mainly used for VoIP calls.
- EMAIL_ID: E-mail addresses, mainly used for VoIP calls
- PSTN: Phone and fax numbers

For internet:
- EMAIL_ID: E-mail addresses without permutations
- IMEI: Numbers of cell phone devices
- IMSI: Numbers of cell phone SIM cards
- IPV4: IP addresses
- PSTN: Phone numbers
- OTHER: For example user names, messenger or social network identifiers, cookies, login-data, phone numbers, hashes, etc.

In the tables that contain telephone selectors there's also a field for a description, like a text explaining the reason for targeting, a code or an abbreviation like CT for Counter-Terrorism.

For internet selectors, these descriptions were only visible for NSA personnel, but due to technical reasons not for BND and are therefore not available anymore. Because they lacked justifications, BND stopped using NSA provided internet selectors for the time being as of May 2015.

Keywords were also used as selectors, but according to the report, they are rarely used, because they have to be very specific. Generic words like "bomb" would produce way too many irrelevant results.

It's not clear whether PSTN only applies to traditional land line phone numbers, or also includes mobile phone numbers (known as MSISDN).

Telephone selectors

Together with experts from BND, special investigator Graulich examined all the selectors on these lists and tried to determine the reason for which they were originally rejected. Most important is the Ablehnungsliste, with the selectors that had been filtered out by the DAFIS system.

Most of the telephone selectors appeared to have been rejected because they belonged to German persons or companies and/or contained .de or (00)49. The e-mail addresses for VoIP calls were all blocked because they had no top-level domain - selectors that could not be attributed to a country were rejected.
On the website it was noticed that for VoIP, one doesn't use e-mail addresses, but SIP addresses, which do have a similar format, like, but which are often under generic top-level domains. Also, blocking IMEI addresses containing "49" wouldn't be very effective, as there are other codes used for Germany, and phones may be sold throughout the European Union.

Some telephone selectors were also not activated because the description field contained terms like for example "German", "Germany" and "Europe".


For one internet identifier, like for example an e-mail address, there are multiple permutations, each of which is counted as a separate selector. There can be up to 20 different permutations for one identifier, which explains the very high total number of internet selectors (7,8 million), compared to those for telephony (690.000).

Such a permutation is used to address the various encoding protocols used on the internet. The report gives the following examples:
mustermann%40internet%2Eorg (HTML-Hex)
mustermann\&\#37; (multiple encodings)
mustermann\\ (UTF-16)
Taken together, all permutations of an internet address are called a Telecommunications Identifier (German: TeleKommunikationsMerkmal or TKM). For telephony, the TKM equals the selector, in other words, there are no permutations for phone numbers.

Internet identifiers

Many internet selectors were rejected by the DAFIS filter system because they belonged to German persons or companies, contained German codes like .de and (00)49, or names of German companies. Also a number of IP addresses had been rejected, but it wasn't possible to determine why. They now belong to providers outside Europe.

The investigator could also not determine what the reasons had been for blocking the remaining internet identifiers, like user names, messenger or social network identifiers, cookies and login-data. NSA provided them combined with other selectors in a so-called equation, but BND separated these for DAFIS filtering, which makes it impossible now to relate them to identifiable selector types.


Of the Telecommunications Identifiers (TKMs) found in the main Ablehnungsliste with the rejected selectors, 62% belong to government agencies of EU member states, 19% to Germans outside Europe, 7% to EU institutions, 6% to Germans, 4 to foreigners abroad, 1% to Germans in Europe and 1% to German embassies.

For all selector lists, the reasons why the selectors were apparently rejected can be found in this table:

Table with the reasons why BND rejected certain NSA selectors
(Table: Graulich report; Translation:; Click to enlarge)

German targets

The examination of the selector lists revealed that NSA provided several hundred selectors related to Germans, but most of them were blocked by the DAFIS filter. Around 250 had been active for a shorter or longer period of time, but it is not known whether this resulted in communications being collected.

As the 2002 Memorandum of Agreement (MoA), under which the cooperation at Bad Aibling was established, prohibits targeting Germans, the German selectors that had been activated are a violation of the agreement, and moreover also a violation of German law.

The rejected selectors are mainly about German companies, both inside Germany and outside Europe. Without knowing the reasons for targeting these companies, it cannot be said whether this would constitute economical espionage. Construction companies for example can be involved in both civilian and military projects (so-called dual-use).

WikiLeaks' lists

It is interesting to see that there are no rejected selectors that belong to German cabinet ministers. This means, NSA wasn't so stupid to send BND the list of selectors that contains the phone numbers of chancellor Merkel, several ministers and high-level federal government officials - a list that was published by WikiLeaks last July.

Even more interesting would be to know whether the rejected selectors contain the phone numbers of the French prime minister and his cabinet ministers, which were on a similar tasking database list that was published by Wikileaks in June. Special investigator Graulich wasn't able to determine this, because Wikileaks redacted the last four digits of the phone numbers.

European targets

The biggest number of rejected selectors are e-mail addresses (and some other internet identifiers) of European government agencies: 22.024 selectors, being the permutations of 2195 telecommunication identifiers (TKMs).

The overwhelming majority of them was only blocked after August 2013, when the public outrage over NSA spying began. First, selectors were disapproved after the investigations by Dr. T. and W.O., and in November, BND president Schindler ordered all e-mail addresses with a European Top-Level Domain (TLD) to be removed from the BND and NSA tasking database.

Before that new directive, the DAFIS filter wasn't configured to block these European selectors:
- Stage 1 of this system only blocked things like the German TLD .de, the telephone country code (00)49 and the IMSI country code 262;
- Stage 2 blocked foreign identifiers when BND noticed that they were used by German citizens or German companies;
- Stage 3 blocked an initially small number of foreign identifiers that should not be activated because that would be against "German interests".

This means that until the end of 2013, the e-mail addresses belonging to European governments had been active in the collection system: 12% of them for up to 100 days and 87% for an even longer period of time.


Foreigners and especially foreign government agencies, have no right to privacy under the German constitution, so the collection of their communications is not a violation of German law. But investigator Graulich does consider the targeting of European governments a violation of the Memorandum of Agreement, which allows collection against European targets only for a very few specific topics.

Although the reasons why NSA was interested in these subjects are not known, the investigator judges that the broad targeting of European governments (like e-mail addresses of all members of government staff bureaus) is far beyond what the memorandum allows, and therefore this constitutes a severe violation of the agreement.


Graulich also says that NSA apparently misused the Bad Aibling satellite station to spy on other European countries - risking an embarrassment for Germany in its relationship with EU and NATO partners.

However, BND itself also targeted for example the British embassy in India and the French embassy in Mali, and eavesdropped on the US Defense and Foreign secretaries as well as senators, when they used non-secure phone lines while traveling.

When in November 2013, BND searched through its own tasking database (PersonenBezogene DatenBestände, or PBDB), it came out that it too contained some 2800 selectors belonging to friendly nations. They were subsequently deleted, but this was kept quiet for almost 2 years.

On November 11, 2015, it was reported that a preliminary report by the investigation team of the parliamentary intelligence oversight committee says that among BND's own selectors, there were ones belonging to the FBI, the Voice of America, French foreign minister Fabius and the interior departments of EU member states like Poland, Austria, Denmark and Croatia. Also targeted were international organizations like the ICC, the WHO and UNICEF. The selectors also included e-mail addresses, phone and fax numbers of the diplomatic representations of the US, France, Great Britain, Sweden, Portugal, Greece, Spain, Italy, Austria, and Switzerland, as well as European and US companies like for example Lockheed.

On November 26, 2015, Albert Karl, an official from the federal Chancellery, testified that European governments are not among the official goals which the government set for BND's intelligence mission (German: AufgabenProfil der Bundesregierung or APB). It's of course possible that European citizens are targeted because they are involved in terrorism or weapon proliferation.

On December 16, 2015, German media reported that at least 3 BND-employees, including SIGINT-director Hartmut Pauland, will have to resign. This after the regular parliamentary intelligence oversight committee found that BND had some 3300 targets, including EU institutions and governments, that were not according to the goals set by the government and therefore illegal. In the future, politically sensitive selectors will have to be approved by the BND leadership.

Crisis regions

One last thing that should be mentioned is that at Bad Aibling, the collection effort is directed at (the downlinks of) satellite links from crisis regions like the Middle East, Afghanistan and Africa. This means, that if NSA deliberately provided BND all those selectors of European government officials, they should have known that they couldn't result in their day-to-day business communications.

Using these selectors to filter traffic from the satellite links from the crisis regions, would only provide content when those European officials communicate with their counterparts or other people over there. And maybe it was just that what NSA wanted to find out - an option that was not considered in the Graulich report though.


In a first reaction on the report, the German government said that there will be stricter guidelines for the cooperation between BND and NSA, and also that oversight by the federal Chancellery will be increased. Opposition party members of the commission aren't fully satisfied with the report and still want access to the rejected selectors, as well as an examination of all 8 million selectors that NSA provided to BND.


On Thursday, November 5, special investigator Dr. Kurt Graulich was heard by the parliamentary investigation commission about his findings. This hearing didn't provide any significant new insights.

The other witness that day, BND lawyer Dr. Werner Ader, revealed that at Bad Aibling, there's highly sophisticated equipment, which allows the interception of satellites even under difficult circumstances, like coping with atmospheric disturbances and following non-geostationary satellites. The equipment "can follow what happens at the satellite".

In the German magazine Der Spiegel from April 2, 2016, it was explained on page 33 that selectors used by BND have the following format: they start with an e-mail address, a phone number or a similar designator, followed by the intelligence topic, with WPR for Waffenproduktion, LAP for Landwirtschaftspolitik, TEF for Terrorfinanzierung and ISG for Islamistische Gefährder, then the country which is spied upon, designated by 3 letters, and finally a Sperrvermerk for those foreign intelligence agencies that should not see the results for this selector. They are designated with a 4-letter abbreviation of their codename, like HORT for HORTENSIE (United States) or BEGO for BEGONIE (Denmark).

Links and sources
- Yahoo News: Germany reins in spy service over NSA report
- Kein Ersatz für Selektorenliste: Abgeordnete Renner und von Notz über Graulich-Bericht
- Geheimdienstaffäre: Sonderermittler spricht von klarem Vertragsbruch der NSA